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  Agricultural trade policy continues to be at the forefront of international 
controversy at both the multilateral level and on various regional fronts.  Meaningful 
agricultural trade liberalization is likely a necessary condition for any significant 
multilateral agreements in the ongoing Doha Development Round at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Within the Asia-Pacific region, a number of bilateral trade 
agreements implicate agricultural support and trade policies in varying degrees.  It is 
evident that Japan, Korea, and other East Asian economies remain relatively closed to 
trade in food, while protection is also high in certain agricultural products in the United 
States, Canada, and Australia. 
  An important, and sometimes overlooked, feature of farm policy is that 
agriculture is a technologically dynamic sector.  Agriculture is in the midst of two 
ongoing technological revolutions -- crop genetics and livestock industrialization -- and is 
in the early stages of a third -- gene modification through recombinant DNA.  These 
technological changes have a number of implications.  First, the evolution of large agro-
business firms devoted to life science has generated substantial industrial concentration 
and vertical integration in the sector.  Second, while research in agricultural product 
development is increasingly undertaken in the private sector, the relationships between 
public research agencies and private firms in establishing basic scientific results are 
growing in complexity.  Third, there is increasing product innovation through the 
                                                 




development of new plant and animal varieties, biologically based inputs for agriculture, 
and crop-based nutritional and pharmaceutical goods.   
Taken together, these factors mean that the industry places growing reliance on 
formal means of protecting new technologies, including intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), and there are strong interests pushing for further strengthening and international 
harmonization in this regard.  There are three major forms of IPRs that affect such 
protection and the willingness to invest in agricultural technologies.  These are patents on 
life forms, plant variety rights, and geographical indications.
2    Also relevant is 
competition policy, including the treatment of exhaustion (parallel imports).    
Put briefly, the growing application of science and industry to agriculture makes 
the sector increasingly globalized, as new technologies and agriculturally based 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) push to extend markets across borders.  This trend 
clearly raises some difficult questions for policymakers in Asia and elsewhere.  For 
example, to what extent can restrictive trade policies and agricultural supports be 
sustained in this environment?  What would reducing such supports imply about the 
ability of firms to invest in agricultural technologies, given other basic determinants of 
comparative advantage in this sector?  What set of IPRs standards would be appropriate 
for nurturing agricultural development and would such IPRs have the potential to offset 
the competitive pressures arising from trade liberalization?  To what extent would IPRs 
need to be supplemented by additional policy support?  How should innovation policies 
be established in light of difficult international controversies regarding sanitary and 
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phytosanitary standards and issues of environmental use and biodiversity?  It is evident 
that such policies exist in a second-best world. 
  In this paper, I offer a largely qualitative analysis of such issues.  While paying 
some attention to the interests of developing countries in East Asia, the emphasis is on 
the main players in Asia-Pacific trade and production in agricultural goods: the United 
States, Canada, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, and Australia.  In the next Section, I 
discuss essential technological changes in agriculture and some basic issues they raise.  In 
Section Three I explain the nature of IPRs in agriculture, including the policy 
environment in major countries.  In Section Four I look at the economic interests of these 
countries by considering information on endowments, technology, production, and trade.  
In Section Five I conclude by taking up the question of linkages between IPRs and other 
supports, including trade policy and agricultural subsidies.  Included are observations 
about the scope for regional policies and reforms in the WTO.   
2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE 
  It is remarkable that standard international trade and investment models view 
agriculture as a competitive industry with constant returns to scale and static technologies.  
In fact, each of these characterizations is inadequate in many ways, at least outside the 
poorest developing countries.  Modern agriculture is subject to considerable 
technological change, rising concentration among farms and agribusiness firms seeking 
economies of scale and scope, and is the beneficiary of massive public research subsidies 
and output or price supports.  These characteristics matter in the formulation of trade 




  To see that agriculture is technologically dynamic, consider the research-intensive 
nature of many globally marketable crops.  Technological progress arises from efforts to 
improve breeding and growing methods, develop new seed varieties, and engineer plants 
and animals to display such beneficial traits as pest resistance, higher yields, and 
nutritional gains.  Thus, hybridization of plant strains involves selecting and combining 
desirable characteristics across species through cross-fertilization and asexual 
reproduction.  Maize, sorghum, and potatoes, among other crops, long have benefited 
from this research.  Breeding techniques based on sexual propagation characterize many 
other forms of plant varieties, including produce and ornamental flowers and trees.   
  Agricultural biotechnology goes beyond this stage to injecting genetic material 
(recombinant DNA) from other, perhaps unrelated, plants and animals into particular 
species in order to develop new varieties with specific characteristics.  Major crops now 
produced with bioengineered technologies include soybeans, cotton, rice, and potatoes.  
Animals are also increasingly the subject of biotechnological applications, with the 
greatest progress existing in dairy production and fish farming.  The newest manifestation 
of agricultural biotechnology involves field testing of so-called nutriceutical plants, the 
products of which are designed to arrive at the consumer's table with a built-in 
combination of nutrition and medical benefits. 
  Agricultural production is characterized also by two further forms of 
technological change.  First is the increasing industrialization of livestock production, 
involving the concentration of large numbers of animals into specific locations and the 
application of antibiotics to sustain animal health and hormones to promote rapid growth.  




Second is the increasing tendency of crops to be differentiated in terms of appearance, 
quality, and production characteristics (including organic foods) in order to generate 
higher value added per unit produced.  This trend is especially prevalent as regards 
processed foods and beverages, and particularly in the increasingly globalized wine 
industry.  
  Each of these activities involves the application of extensive research funds and 
scientific personnel to both basic science (such as biogenetic research tools) and applied 
agriculture (such as seed varieties, livestock antibiotics, and extension services).  In 
consequence, there is a complex mix of public research support and private development 
work in all areas of agricultural technology.  This mix, and the attendant gains from 
investments in technology, vary considerably across countries and affect the economic 
interests that nations have in international trade and technology policy.  Further, the types 
of IPRs used in each of these areas are different across products and countries, generating 
pressure for further policy reform and harmonization.  To illuminate these facts the 
discussion turns next to a deeper discussion of technological change, competition, and 
IPRs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
a. Agricultural Technology in the Asia-Pacific Region 
  Traditional agricultural methods involves farmers selecting and cultivating the 
most successful plant strains from natural landraces and then exchanging seeds in 
informal markets.  This tradition remains in place in rural regions of the poorest countries 
but is not much in evidence among the middle-income and high-income economies of the 




application of science to the selection and improvement of crops in order to achieve the 
massive productivity gains that have benefited rising populations.   
  The development of high-yielding modern crop varieties dates from the late 19
th 
century with the advent of scientific breeding technologies in North America and Europe 
(Evenson, 2004).  Hybridization methods in maize spread through these areas relatively 
quickly and later were applied to sorghum, millet, and rice varieties (Griliches, 1957).  
Hybridization techniques were adopted successfully by the private sector in the absence 
of legal intellectual property protection because hybrids produce a one-generation 
“heterosis” effect that precludes the germination of saved seeds, forcing farmers to pay 
for new seeds each season (Goeschl and Swanson, 2000).  Other forms of breeding that 
generated new varieties of wheat, other grains, flowers, and produce did not carry their 
own technological protection of this kind, leading to industry pressures within the United 
States for the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 
(Watal, 2001).  Other countries in the region followed later, as noted below.   
  The international diffusion of modern crop varieties into Asian developing 
economies is most closely attributed to the Green Revolution, under which rice and wheat 
varieties bred for stability and strength by public agricultural institutions were introduced 
and improved in various regions, beginning in the 1960s.  Diffusion of new varieties 
continued to grow through the 1990s and, by that decade, modern strains had dominated 
agricultural production in Asia (Evenson, 2004).  Thus, by the 1990s over 80% of area 
planted in wheat and over 60% of area planted in maize, rice, and other cereals were of 




transformation of Chinese agriculture into widespread use of scientifically developed 
plant strains.   
The major countries of the Asia-Pacific region are enthusiastic adopters of plant 
varieties developed by breeding techniques.  While the United States has the oldest legal 
system for protecting such investments, seed industries flourish in Canada, Australia, 
Japan, Korea, and China as well.  Outside China these industries are largely made up of 
private enterprises, though all rely on significant research support from their governments 
and on learning from international information sources and reverse engineering.  In 2002 
the United States had the largest internal commercial market for seed and planting 
materials at $5.7 billion, followed by China at $3.0 billion, and Japan at $2.5 billion.
3  
Canada and Australia were also large markets for exchanging seeds.  The United States 
was the largest gross exporter of commercial seeds, at $799 million.  Other export figures 
included Canada ($122 million), Japan ($105 million, almost completely in horticultural 
varieties), Australia at $43 million, China at $30 million, and Korea at $16 million, 
though some of these nations were presumably net importers.  Thus, the exchange of 
plant materials is a large and globalized industry. 
  In recent years the reliance on plant genetics for breeding new varieties has been 
complemented by the use of transgenic methods for developing new plants that achieve 
certain technical or aesthetic characteristics.  Biotechnology, or the so-called Gene 
Revolution, differs from plant genetics chiefly in accelerating the development of new 
varieties, and even new species, by operating at the cellular level to engineer specific 
traits.   Crops have been genetically modified (GM) primarily to increase herbicide 
                                                 




tolerance and insect resistance (James, 2003), permitting significantly lower use of 
chemicals and generating higher yields.  For example, research in China suggests that Bt 
cotton has reduced per-hectare costs by 82 percent, owing to lower pesticide and labor 
use, while raising yields by up to 15 percent (Huang et al., 2002).   
  There are four major GM crops in commercial production today, including 
soybeans, maize, cotton, and canola, though trials are under way in many other products.  
The global diffusion of such crops, at least in terms of area planted, has been remarkable.  
From a base of zero hectares in 1995, the global area of transgenic crops grew to almost 
70 million hectares in 2003 (James, 2003).  However, this has taken place in only 18 
countries and only ten have devoted more than 50,000 hectares to GM crops.  In the Asia-
Pacific region, the United States is by far the largest producer, followed by Canada, 
China, and Australia.  China in particular has been a recent and enthusiastic adopter of 
GM technologies.  It is anticipated that Chinese farmers will have a 92 percent adoption 
rate of Bt cotton and a 95 percent adoption rate of GM rice by the year 2010 (Huang et al., 
2002). 
  For well known reasons, however, this enthusiasm is not shared by Japan and 
Korea.  Like their counterparts in Europe, consumers and environmental groups in these 
countries are concerned about the food safety aspects of GM crops and the implications 
of widespread adoption for biodiversity and environmental stability.  While these 
concerns have yet to be shown to have scientific validity, they resonate with policy 
makers, who pursue a mix of regulatory delays and labeling requirements to slow the 




limit the spread of new technologies into Japanese and Korean farming, which remain 
reliant on smaller farms and higher-cost techniques.    
  As noted earlier, a final form of major technological change in agriculture has 
been the industrialization of animal husbandry through the development of large feedlots, 
poultry farms, and fish and crustacean farms.  The ability to concentrate the raising of 
animals in single locations generates substantial economies of scale in producing protein, 
which itself has spurred growth of consumption standards in Asia-Pacific economies.  In 
itself, this trend relies relatively little on science and IPRs.  However, to make such 
industrialization feasible, agribusiness firms have developed antibiotics, vaccines, and 
scientifically balanced feeds to promote growth and control disease.  These technologies 
are central to the transformation of livestock husbandry from a pastoral and gathering 
occupation to an industrial activity.  This activity is well advanced in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia, while it is emerging quickly in the Asian countries.  China in 
particular is adopting industrialized techniques, while the prevalence of fish farming in 
Vietnam and Thailand is well established. 
b. Industrial Implications 
  The succeeding application of new technological knowledge and techniques to 
agriculture has generated at least three important and interrelated outcomes for 
competition and market structure.  First is the establishment of large life science 
companies that organize the production of biologically based inputs for farming, 
including seed varieties, hybrids, agricultural chemicals, genetic technologies, feeds, and 
animal medicaments.  There are economies of scope in developing multiple product lines 




There are also economies of scale arising from the research intensity of these activities.  
Like other intellectual property-intensive sectors, there may be high fixed costs of 
developing a new biogenetic plant or animal vaccine but the marginal costs of production 
and distribution are low.   
  Most prominently this concentration has emerged from the acquisition of seed 
companies by agricultural biotechnology firms.  Thus, for example, Monsanto (an 
American company) acquired six large seed firms by 2000, including DeKalb, Holden, 
and Cargill International.  DuPont (USA) acquired Pioneer, while Aventis (France and 
Germany) bought four companies.  The entry of pharmaceutical companies into the 
industry is illustrated by Syngenta (Switzerland), which is a merger of Novartis and 
AstraZeneca, a company that had acquired numerous large seed firms.  These four 
merged corporations, along with Dow Agrosciences (USA), constitute the bulk of global 
suppliers in biological agricultural inputs (Dhar 2002).   
There are other important suppliers in Asia, including the Beijing Seed 
Corporation (China), Mitsubishi (Japan), Takii (Japan), and Charoen Pokphand 
(Thailand) (Kuyek, 2001).  However, the science-based agricultural inputs industry is 
dominated by corporations from the developed countries.  Asian developing countries, 
including China and Korea, lag considerably in the development and registration of new 
technologies in this area and remain net importers.    
A second feature is that R&D in the agricultural life sciences is increasingly 
undertaken by private firms, rather than public research institutes, in the developed 
market economies.  To be sure there is a substantial role played by governments in the 




and recombinant technologies.  However, the U.S. biotechnology industry has been built 
on applications undertaken by private firms, often spun off from university laboratories 
under terms of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.  Successful technologies developed in this 
fashion generally have been gathered into the ambit of larger corporations through 
acquisitions.  Indeed, the U.S. government considers the privatization of even basic 
research results to be a valuable form of international competitive advantage (Barton and 
Maskus, 2004).  Thus, the fruits of its research subsidies ultimately find their way into 
private channels of production, trade, and investment.   
This privatization of agricultural research raises concerns in some quarters about 
potential impacts on costs for farmers in poor countries and on sustainable development 
(Dutfield, 2000).  These concerns are compounded by the diminished relative presence of 
national research services and international agricultural research centers (IARCs) in 
developing new agricultural technologies (Evenson, 2004).  Nonetheless, Korea and 
Japan have moved toward greater reliance on private firms for commercializing 
agricultural research, and China actively has sought to establish quasi-private 
biotechnology enterprises associated with government laboratories and universities 
(Maskus, 2004).  
  The third feature of the technology intensity of modern agriculture is the growing 
reliance on intellectual property protection to ensure the appropriability of returns to 
investment in R&D.  Both plant varieties (other than hybrids) and biotechnological 
inventions are extreme cases of technologies on which it is extremely difficult to practice 
technical exclusion.  This is obvious in the case of new plants, for harvested seeds 




protection of some kind, the introduction of new plant varieties quickly generates a large 
pool of potential free riders (farmers), thereby diminishing up-front incentives for 
research.  For their part, many biotechnological products are easily reverse engineered 
through the application of genetic techniques.  IPRs are so central to competition in these 
industries that it is important to review the main forms of protection. 
3. THE PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 
a. The Role of IPRs 
With this complexity of technological change, participants, and demand patterns, 
a complicated set of public policies is required to support the movement of technologies 
from laboratories to embodied products on the market.  A central and critical policy is the 
set of IPRs, which set out the boundaries within which their owners have exclusive rights 
to produce, sell, and license a technology or product.  For an economy seeking to develop 
and benefit from its agriculture, biotechnology, and agribusiness industries, IPRs provide 
the framework for balancing several objectives.   
First, costs of inventing and marketing new seed varieties and bio-engineered 
plants and foods are high, because of research expenditures, uncertainty of outcomes, and 
costly and lengthy testing and approval procedures.  In order for inventors to recover 
these R&D costs, there must be some form of market exclusivity because appropriability 
of market returns is an acute problem.  Biotechnologies have a natural appropriation 
problem because they have qualities that make imitation by others feasible at relatively 
low costs.   This problem is easily seen in the agricultural sector.  Innovative plant 




by virtue of cultivating the plants.  Thus, new plant varieties may face competing 
production and sales simply by being placed on the market in the first place, an act that 
carries an implicit license for replication and production without enumerated rights 
(Swanson, 2002).  Intellectual property rights (IPRs), primarily in the forms of patents 
and plant variety protection, therefore provide the exclusivity needed to earn returns to 
invention and innovation.  Patents are critically important for this purpose in the 
biotechnology sector (Barton, 2002; Maskus, 2000).   
A second purpose of IPRs is to provide incentives to bring new technologies and 
products to the market in order to achieve consumer and industrial benefits.  While public 
research programs may be effective at developing new knowledge, universities and 
public laboratories in the past have been ineffective at commercializing it through 
embodied products, a situation that remains true in much of the developing world and 
transition economies, including China (Maskus, 2004).  In recognition of this difficulty, 
the United States enacted the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, permitting universities to assert 
patent rights over inventions developed with their facilities and encouraging licensing of 
those rights.  This approach has been central to the development of the biotechnology-
based agricultural sector (Thursby and Jensen, 2001).  It facilitates allocation of rights in 
a complex contracting game in order to move technologies through to the production and 
marketing stage.  This ability to encourage transfer of knowledge through licensing of 
rights is perhaps the most significant, if under-appreciated, pro-development aspect of 
IPRs.  
A final objective of IPRs is to promote diffusion of knowledge into the broader 




them available for inspection, reverse engineering, and development of competing new 
technologies.  More directly it happens through publication and disclosure requirements 
in patents and plant variety protection.   
Despite the potential dynamic economic gains from protecting intellectual 
property, IPRs are limited in duration and scope order to prevent anti-competitive abuses 
by rights holders.  These limitations are discussed in the following sub-section, which 
briefly explains the major types of protection for agricultural technologies.  That IPRs are 
limited, however, indicates clearly that interest in the strength of protection varies 
naturally over time and across countries.  Protection in the United States, Canada, and 
Japan is far stronger now than it was 20 years ago, reflecting their status as major 
developers and net exporters of intellectual assets.  Standards in middle-income 
economies and poor countries tend to be weaker, for they perceive few interests in 
protecting the rights of foreign technology developers and may see weak IPRs as a form 
of industrial policy to promote local firms (Maskus, 2000).  Nonetheless, China and 
Korea have adopted strong intellectual property protection in anticipation of developing 
sophisticated technology.   
b. Forms of Intellectual Property Protection 
  The IPRs of most relevance to agriculture and agribusiness include patents, plant 
variety rights (PVRs), trade secrets, and geographical indications, which we describe 
briefly here.  A patent provides its owner the right to exclude all others from making, selling, 
importing, or using the product or process named in the patent without authorization for a 
fixed period of time.  It provides exclusive rights to the physical representation, in the forms 




  For an invention to be patentable it must meet three criteria: it must be novel (that is, 
previously unknown), it must contain an inventive step (that is, a step that is non-obvious to 
one skilled in the area of technology it represents), and it must be useful or have industrial 
utility.  Novelty and non-obviousness are important for they set the technical bar that patent 
examiners must certify has been met in order to award protection.  The utility standard is 
also important because it essentially determines the dividing line between basic research 
discoveries, which are generally unpatentable outside the United States, and applied 
inventions. 
  Patents are provided for a fixed length of time, a minimum of 20 years from the 
filing date under the TRIPS agreement.  The breadth or scope of the patent may vary.   
Inventors make claims about the protectable novelty of their inventions but examiners may 
narrow the claims or modify or reject them.  While the claims recognized in a patent grant 
establish the literal terms of protected subject matter, patent scope may be complemented by 
a legal “doctrine of equivalents”.  This doctrine permits patent owners to litigate against 
competing products and technologies that may be shown to rely on techniques that are 
essentially equivalent to those in the patent grant.   
The market power associated with patents may impose social costs even as it 
encourages invention and commercialization.  Accordingly, patents are limited in duration 
and breadth.  They carry disclosure requirements and, in many nations, must be worked in 
order to sustain protection.  The severity of these limitations varies across countries.   
Moreover, the potential for abusing the market power inherent in patent grants is recognized 
in national competition policies.  Attempts to extend protection beyond the patent grant are 




Surveys performed of corporate research managers in the United States tend to 
find that patents are less important than other factors in decisions about whether to 
undertake R&D in technologically complex products, though they are useful for 
encouraging technological rivals to cross-license (Cohen et al., 2000).  However, the 
major sectors in which the promise of patents is relied upon for undertaking R&D and 
attracting capital are pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, including the 
biotechnology components of both industries.  One prominent observer claims that 
without patents the biotechnology industry could not develop (Barton, 2002).   
While patents may also be available, new plant varieties are protected by special 
systems designed for that purpose.  PVRs permit developers of new plant varieties to 
control their marketing and use.  These rights operate much like patents, being provided for 
fixed terms.  However, rather than requirements that new plants be non-obvious and have 
industrial utility, a weaker stipulation exists that plants be distinctive from earlier varieties 
and genetically stable.  They differ also from patents in that they permit certain fair-use 
exceptions that are not available in patents.  Under some systems a research exception is 
provided in which a protected plant variety may be used by competitive rivals as a parent in 
a breeding program to develop improved plants.  More important is the farmer’s privilege, 
whereby individual farmers may retain enough seeds from each year’s crop for re-planting 
in the following season.  Such re-planting rights are not often invoked in the developed 
economies, where farmers typically find it advantageous to purchase new seeds on the 
market each year in order to benefit from newer technologies.  The exception is often 
employed in developing economies, though many such economies do not yet have 




The TRIPS Agreement in Article 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that 
WTO members protect plant varieties either with patents or an effective sui generis 
system of exclusive rights (or both).  The de facto standard for a system of PVRs is the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (the UPOV 
Convention), which first came into force among mainly European nations in 1968.   
Revised UPOV Acts in 1978 and 1991 now determine the scope of protection from which 
countries may select.  The 1978 Act retains the research exception and the farmer's 
privilege, while these standards were tightened considerably in the 1991 Act.   
Specifically under the terms of the later act, breeders must develop new varieties that are 
not “essentially derived” from protected parents, and farmers may only retain seed for use 
on their own land and no marketing or exchange of protected seeds is permitted.  Even 
this latter privilege needs to be affirmatively established in national laws.  Only the 1991 
Act is open for accession at this time and countries joining UPOV therefore commit 
themselves to restricting the freedom of research institutes, breeders, and farmers to 
operate in this realm.  As might be expected, in negotiating bilateral trade arrangements 
with developing countries the United States generally demands that its partners join 
UPOV 1991 or conform with its standards.  This has been the case with Chile and 
Vietnam, among other countries.  
Trade secrets provide protection for any information (whether patentable or not) 
that has economic value and is prevented from disclosure by firms through reasonable 
efforts.  Trade secrets may be critical for biological materials that are not sold, but rather 
used in production.  Examples include a microorganism used to make a drug or a parent 




that the inventor is not required to publish the protected information.  TRIPS requires 
countries to set out laws defining the nature of unfair competition in this area, with the 
intention of raising the costs of learning technical business secrets through permissible 
reverse engineering and encouraging labor mobility. 
Geographical indications (GIs) are a final form of IPRs of interest to agriculture.  A 
geographical indication is a name, word, logo or other mark that identifies a product as 
having originated in a particular region, locality, or country, where reputation or some 
quality characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to that origin.  GIs most readily 
attach to wines and spirits, though they are relevant for foods, food products, tobacco 
products, or other agriculturally based goods.  By providing enterprises located within a 
region the exclusive rights to display the regional name on their products and marketing, GIs 
offer incentives to improve or safeguard these inherent quality characteristics.  In turn, such 
products should command a price premium on the marketplace, generating larger value 
added per unit sold.  Many see this as a mechanism for raising incomes in agriculturally 
based developing economies, though the major users at present are European nations. 
There is a dual structure of protection for GIs in the TRIPS Agreement.   The most 
general obligation is that countries must permit interested parties to use legal means to 
prevent the identification or presentation of a good that would mislead consumers as to its 
true geographical origin and to prevent acts of unfair competition in this regard.
4  WTO 
Members also must provide for refusal or invalidation of trademarks containing 
misleading geographical indications.  These general requirements must be afforded any 
                                                 





product for which GI protection might be sought.  However, terms that are generic within 
a territory need not be awarded GI protection and countries are not required to recognize 
GIs that are not protected in their country of origin or have fallen into disuse there.   
  TRIPS calls for a higher level of protection for GIs for wines and spirits.  The 
Agreement requires WTO Members to prevent the use of GIs identifying wines and 
spirits that do not originate in the place indicated, even where the true place of origin is 
indicated or the GI is used in translation or accompanied by such expressions as “kind”, 
“imitation”, or the like.  Further, it mandates negotiations concerning the establishment of 
a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for wines eligible for 
protection in those Members choosing to participate in the registration system. Ongoing 
negotiations at the TRIPS Council seek to determine whether to extend this stronger 
protection for wines and spirits to GIs for other products.   
c. Related International Obligations 
  While IPRs are the focus of this paper, it is important to note that other 
international obligations affect international trade and investment in agriculture.  Most 
prominent are food safety rules, with WTO members obliged to meet terms of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.  In essence this agreement 
requires importing nations to demonstrate that their food safety laws are not disguised 
restrictions on trade and are based on scientific testing and risk assessment.  It also 
effectively sets internationally recognized food standards (generally set through Codex 
Alimentarius) as minimum safety levels that exporters must meet, though importing 




some limitations on the ability of governments to use food standards as means of 
protecting domestic agriculture from trade competition. 
  A second important area is the application of safety principles to genetically 
modified foods.  The United States, Canada, and China are enthusiastic producers of GM 
foods but subject firms to meeting bio-safety rules as regards nutrition and the 
environment.  Japan and Korea do not produce GM foods and subject imports to rigorous 
rules governing maximum share of GM inputs and labeling requirements.  They may 
choose to follow the European Union in asserting rules for tracking the separation of GM 
products and non-GM products.  Thus, such rules significantly affect the prospects for 
economies to expand exports of bio-engineered foods.  Indeed, the Cartagena Protocol 
(2000) to the Convention on Biodiversity recognizes the right of countries to exclude 
imports of GM foods under the “precautionary principle”.  At this time, among East 
Asian and North American economies the Protocol has been ratified only by Japan, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Mexico, none of which produces GM foods.
5  
d. An Overview of Policy Approaches 
  A brief review of policy stances in the major Asia-Pacific countries in the area of 
IPRs is in order.  For this purpose, the laws of each country are summarized in Table 1.
6  
As might be expected, the United States has the strongest protection regime for 
agricultural IPRs.  It provides patents on higher-order life forms and, within the area of 
biotechnology, permits broad patent claims on genetic discoveries (such as genetic 
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sequences and specific genes) and research tools in addition to exclusive rights on GM 
products.  The United States permits both patents and PVRs on new plant varieties, 
including those developed from genetic engineering, though patents apply only to plants 
that reproduce asexually.  Moreover, its plant variety law conforms to UPOV 1991 and 
therefore significantly restricts the ability of rival breeders to use protected plants in 
research as breeding stock or germplasm.  As for geographical indications, the United 
States offers no specific protection for these devices.  Rather, companies within a region 
are free to register certification marks, which certify origin with no necessary relationship 
to quality characteristics.  Indeed, the United States is opposed to their extension beyond 
wines and spirits at the WTO, believing that trademarks and certification marks offer 
sufficient incentives for the development of niche foodstuffs. 
  Japan's system of IPRs in agriculture is close to that of the United States, 
reflecting the recent convergence in its laws with American laws and the general 
strengthening of the Japanese regime (Maskus, 2002, Nagaoka, 2005).  Japan strongly 
protects plant varieties with both PVRs and patents (on both sexually and asexually 
reproducing plants), reflecting the interests of its horticultural industry.  However, it 
relies on trademarks and unfair competition laws to prevent misleading application of 
geographical names to products.  Korea's system has also converged on that of the United 
States, especially as regards certification marks for protecting place names.  Korea does 
not yet award patents to genetic discoveries.   
  China's regime is designed to encourage innovation in agricultural biotechnology, 
while retaining strong regard for follow-on competition.  Thus, China does not offer 




under the weaker terms of the 1978 UPOV Convention, permitting a breeder's research 
exemption and the farmer's privilege.  Finally, Canada and Australia follow similar 
regimes.  Canada does not patent plant varieties but does offer patents on novel and 
inventive plant cells.  As befits its high-quality wine industry, Australia protects 
geographical indications in wines, largely as a result of a bilateral arrangement on this 
subject with the European Union. 
  Overall, while there are noteworthy differences in these approaches to protecting 
technology in agriculture, the various regimes in these countries offer strong protection 
for inventors and plant developers.  In this context, differences in IPRs per se are not 
likely to be significant distortions to trade and investment in foods and food products in 
the region. 
4. ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES 
a. Production and Trade 
Some basic perspective on the agricultural economies of major Asia-Pacific 
economies is provided in Tables 2 and 3.
7  As may be seen in Table 2, rice is grown in 
large quantities in all of the seven countries listed.  Thailand and Vietnam devote the 
largest land areas per capita to rice paddy and are major producers, trailing only China 
with its massive scale. Despite its large allocation of land to rice cultivation, Korea 
produced on average only 6.9 million metric tons of rice.  Japan produces larger 
quantities, but rice farmers in both Korea and Japan evidently display lower productivity 
                                                 
7 I exclude Canada, which has a comparative advantage structure similar to the United States and Australia, 




than do farmers elsewhere.  This is borne out by the figures on international trade in 
Table 3, which show that those two countries are major net importers of rice, despite the 
extensive protection and support for rice producers (Table 4).  Korea and Japan also 
produce virtually no maize, wheat, soybeans, and cotton, procuring their needs from 
imports.   
In contrast, the United States is a significant net exporter of grains, cotton, and 
beef (Table 3), though it retains extensive producer subsidies for wheat, maize, and rice.  
The United States is a net importer of sugar, which is heavily protected, fruits and 
vegetables, and fish and seafood.  Thailand and Vietnam are large net exporters of fish 
and seafood, much of it to the United States, a factor underlying recent U.S. antidumping 
actions in catfish and shrimp.  The growth of production and exports in this sector in 
Vietnam since the late 1990s has been extraordinary.   
China is a large producer of all the commodities listed except cotton, and that 
product has grown rapidly since the introduction of Bt cotton (Huang et al., 2002).   
China's trade picture in agriculture is mixed across commodities, with surpluses in rice, 
maize, fruits and vegetables, and fish and seafood, while experiencing deficits in wheat, 
sugar, soybeans, cotton, and beef.  Rapid economic growth since 2002 presumably has 
increased China's net import positions, particularly in wheat and soybeans.   
With the exception of China, the countries in Tables 2 and 3 present a picture of 
decided comparative advantage and disadvantage in agricultural products.  Among the 
richer countries, the United States and Australia demonstrate net export positions in most 
commodities.  This is especially true for Australia in wheat, cotton, and beef.  Australia's 




intellectual property protection, is demonstrated clearly in Table 3.  However, Japan and 
Korea are net importers of most products, including wine.  Thailand and Vietnam display 
similar net export positions in agricultural goods and have particular comparative 
advantages in rice, sugar, fruits and vegetables, and fish and seafood. 
It is impossible to discuss agricultural trade without recognizing the extensive 
protection from imports and production subsidies that affect production and exchange.  
Tables 4a through 4c provide recent computations of various measures of protection.  In 
Table 4a are producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for OECD members in the group 
studied here.  These are made up of market price supports and payments based on outputs 
or area planted as a percentage of total farm income.  Japan and Korea provide the most 
extensive support, ranging up to 89 percent for Korean oilseeds producers and 86 percent 
for Japanese wheat and rice farmers.  The United States and Canada offer significant 
support as well, most of it tied to production.  Within this group of countries only the 
United States pays export subsidies, an element of central concern in the Doha Round 
negotiations. 
The figures in Table 4b reflect estimates of average border protection in different 
crops.  These figures are bound tariff rates averaged across tariff lines, incorporating both 
primary and processed products.  Measured this way, protection in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia is slight, with the exception of sugar.  Korea has high bound tariff 
rates in wheat, cereals, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables, though its applied tariffs are 
presumably lower.  Thailand has bound tariff rates in agriculture that range from 17 
percent in cotton to 49 percent in sugar.  Finally, the estimates for China are based on 




to form nominal rates of protection.  These estimates suggest that China strongly protects 
sugar, cotton, and oilseeds but penalizes rice, meats, and fruits and vegetables slightly.  It 
should be noted that China intends to move toward a tariff-rate quota system that is likely 
to raise the average nominal protection for these commodities by 2007 (Anderson et al., 
2004). 
The bound tariffs in Table 4b are misleading about true levels of protection 
because they fail to account for the tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) that abound in agricultural 
tariff lines.  Thus, in Table 4c, I list average in-quota and over-quota tariff rates for 
products subject to TRQs in North America and the Asia-Pacific region.  It is evident that 
within-quota rates seem moderate in North America, ranging from two percent in cotton 
to 28 percent in sugar, but import levels beyond the quota restraints encounter significant 
increases in tariff rates.  Both in-quota and over-quota rates tend to be higher in the Asia-
Pacific area.  Whether the higher over-quota rates matter depends on the fill rates for 
specific quotas, though it is likely that the higher over-quota taxes act as a deterrent to 
actual fulfillment. 
Overall, this review of trade restrictions suggests that agricultural production and 
trade remain subject to significant distortions from government policy.  Negotiating 
reductions in these barriers is likely to be extremely difficult without some offsetting 
gains in other aspects of trade regulation, one candidate for which is intellectual property 
protection. 
b. Innovation and Intellectual Property  
Each of the major countries considered in this paper has extensive public research 




research activities to applied extension services.  Japan, for example, has a public agency, 
the National Agricultural and Bio-oriented Research Organization, which manages five 
regional research institutes and six specialized research institutes.  Research centers at 
Nagoya University, University of Tokyo, and other institutions work on developing 
agricultural technologies and methods of transferring technology to industry and farming, 
including through the registration and licensing of IPRs.  China has established linkages 
among its public research laboratories and universities in order to develop agricultural 
and medical biotechnologies and to improve biosafety regulations.  In the past Chinese 
public research agencies have been ineffective at commercializing their inventions 
(Maskus et al., 2004), but in recent years their ability to transfer technology has improved.     
The United States has devoted the most resources to agricultural technology 
development and has a deep innovation system ranging from research-intensive land-
grant universities to government extension services and research laboratories and on to 
farmers, agribusiness firms, and agro-biotechnology companies.  This broad approach to 
developing knowledge and applied agricultural technologies implies that the sector is 
R&D intensive and employs far more labor and capital than a straightforward listing of 
numbers of farmers would imply.  It also implies that the United States remains the major 
source of agricultural technologies on a global scale. 
To appreciate the relative success of major Asia-Pacific economies in agricultural 
innovation, consider the figures in Tables 5 and 6.  The first two columns in Table 5 
show the numbers of plant variety certificates in place in 1998 and 2002.  As noted above, 
the United States permits plant developers to choose plant variety protection or patent 




forms of protection granted in the United States over this period.  U.S.- resident 
developers filed far more applications, and received more certificates, than foreign 
developers.  It is interesting to note, however, that the number of applications fell in this 
period, while the number of patent applications rose sharply, especially on behalf of non-
residents.  Indeed, in 2002, more patents were issued to non-residents than to residents, 
attesting to the global nature of this industry.  Japan awards the largest number of plant 
variety certificates of all the countries in the list, the great majority of which go to 
Japanese inventors.  However, there was a large increase in certificates issued to non-
residents.   
The plant variety protection laws in China and Korea are relatively new but both 
have attracted significant increases in applications and registrations.  China as of 2002 
had not issued any certificates to foreign residents, who experience some difficulties in 
application procedures (Maskus, 2004).  Korea saw a dramatic increase in applications 
for PVRs between 1998 and 2002 by non-residents.  Canada and Australia have also 
witnessed significant increases in non-resident applications and grants.  The overall 
impression from Table 5 is that there is significant growth in innovative activity in 
developing new plant varieties, including biotechnological strains, and in protecting those 
inventions within the Asia-Pacific region.  Japanese developers are especially active in 
registering for protection at home. 
The figures in Table 6 relate patent grants awarded over the period 1997-2001 in 
the United States for those patent classifications most relevant to agriculture.  Also listed 
is a measure I call “revealed technology advantage”, which is defined as: 




This ratio calculates the share of country j's patents in classification i of global patents in 
classification i, divided by the share of country j's patents in global patents (where global 
means all patents taken out in the United States).  The measure is precisely analogous to 
the standard measure of revealed comparative advantage in trade and is designed to find 
out if a country tends to register a disproportionately higher share of patents in a 
particular technology classification than it does overall in the United States.  A ratio 
greater than one suggests a technological specialization in that category. 
  Patent classification 047 is plant husbandry and is the closest (though narrower) 
category to the plant variety patents listed in Table 5.  The United States received by far 
the greatest number of patents in this category over the period and has a revealed 
advantage in it.  Japan registered 69 plant husbandry patents, which was the largest 
number of any foreign country, but its RTA suggests that Japanese inventors tend to 
specialize in non-agricultural technologies.
8  Similar comments apply to China and Korea, 
which together registered only one patent.  In contrast, Canada and Australia display 
large RTAs in plant husbandry.  The situation across countries is the same in category 
119, animal husbandry. 
  Category 424, bio-affecting drugs, involves agricultural drugs as a component but 
is broader than just farming.  Japan again registered a large number of patents but did not 
achieve an RTA.  In contrast, China's RTA demonstrates a significant specialization in 
this area as regards technological resources.  Also interesting in this context is category 
                                                 
8 Listed for comparison purposes is classification 438, which is semiconductor device manufacturing 
processes.  Japan had a revealed advantage in this area, as did Korea, pointing to the specialization of R&D 




800, multicellular living organisms.  While these organisms are generally not patentable 
outside the United States and Japan, all countries considered have registered patents in 
the former nation.  While the number is small, China's RTA suggests also a relative 
specialization in this area of technology, as do those of Canada and Australia.  Again, 
Japan and Korea display technological disadvantages in developing new organisms.   
  The picture supported by this review of innovation data is the following.   
Japanese inventors are active in all areas of agricultural technology, including 
biotechnology, and register large numbers of plant variety certificates in particular.   
However, in the aggregate Japanese invention is not specialized in these areas, at least as 
far as registration of patents in the United States is concerned.  Korea has become more 
active in developing new plant registrations but has not achieved a specialization in new 
agricultural technology.  Canada, Australia, and the United States, as nations with 
significant comparative advantages in agricultural commodities, have specialized their 
invention resources in developing agricultural and biotechnological inventions.  Australia 
also has moved forcefully into registration of geographical indications in wine.  Finally, 
China is emerging as a producer of new agricultural knowledge and drugs.   
On this basis it is sensible to infer that all the countries in this sample share an 
interest in protecting intellectual property, though Korea and China remain more in the 
form of technology followers in these areas of knowledge.  As a result, these countries 
may have greater interests in limiting the scope of patent protection in order to enhance 
access to newer technologies.  At the same time, China has decided to promote 




security.  Attracting these technologies from abroad and moving them from public 
laboratories to the marketplace presume the existence of well specified IPRs.  
5. LINKING IPRS TO TRADE POLICY  
  The point of assessing the state of trade protection and IPRs in agriculture in this 
paper is essentially to bring out some relationships between them that are relevant for 
agricultural trade liberalization in the region.  Significant pressure exists to open markets 
in Japan, Korea, and China while reducing the scope of farming subsidies in the United 
States and Canada in order to increase market access for efficient agricultural exporters.  
Similar liberalization commitments may be expected of the poorer economies, including 
Thailand and, assuming its WTO accession procedure is fruitful, Vietnam.  Indeed, the 
Doha Round is likely to be defined by its progress on this basic question of agricultural 
liberalization. 
  At the same time there are negotiations at the WTO and WIPO on extending or 
modifying the global IPRs regime, some of which is directly relevant for agriculture.  
Most prominent are discussions about extending the reach of GIs to new products and 
countries.  However, the issue of patentability of life forms and of protection for plant 
varieties (Article 27.3 of TRIPS) may be revisited, while deliberations at WIPO seek to 
establish a global harmonization of patent standards and practices.  Finally, questions of 
biosafety and the treatment of biotechnological products and labeling in international 
trade loom large in the agricultural arena.  It is useful, therefore, to conclude the chapter 
by considering the forms in which such discussions may evolve and the interests of the 




a. IPRs and Trade Policy 
  The inherent ambiguity in interests about IPRs poses the interesting question of 
whether the use of intellectual property protection can be complementary to trade 
liberalization in agriculture.  The conventional wisdom among economists seems to be 
that stronger patents or PVRs would reduce the access of local farmers and 
agribusinesses to seeds, fertilizers, biogenetic inventions, and other technologies by 
raising the costs of reverse engineering and imitation (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, 2002).  Strong IPRs offer market power to R&D-intensive agribusiness 
firms, which as noted above, are heavily concentrated on a global scale.  These firms may 
use their protected positions to raise seed costs and segment technology markets.  Thus, 
tariff cuts and strengthened IPRs both would be sources of pressure on inefficient and 
technologically lagging farming sectors.  Put differently, countries cutting tariffs might 
be expected to weaken intellectual property protection in order to sustain the competitive 
position of domestic farmers (Zigic, 2000).  
  The risk is real that farmers in high-cost economies with lagging technologies will 
suffer greater competitive pressures from both trade liberalization and tight IPRs.  While 
this description may most readily describe the current situation in such low-income 
economies as Vietnam and China, it applies as well to Japan and Korea, where farms tend 
to be small and inefficient.  The latter countries have few options in terms of limiting 
intellectual property protection and, as a result, may be even more resistant to opening up 
to imports.  In contrast, the major agricultural exporters are also net developers of 




have strong interests in greater market access for agricultural goods within the region to 
complement their gains from exploiting intellectual property. 
  While this analysis suggests a sharp difference of interests in the region, in truth 
the situation is more complex.  After all, the essential purposes of protecting IPRs are to 
encourage domestic innovation, promote market development and licensing to enhance 
information diffusion, and to increase access to domestic and foreign technologies.  To 
the extent these outcomes emerge, a country's farming sector should become more 
competitive over time, even if there are short-run costs as a result of higher costs of 
imitation and technology purchases.  A significant variant is the need for productivity 
growth in agriculture in order to sustain incomes (even as the number of farmers 
diminishes) and to improve nutrition and food security.  China, in particular, envisions 
such gains emanating from extensive deployment of agricultural biotechnologies, the 
development of which is increasingly dependent on IPRs.  Patents, trademarks, and trade 
secrets have significant potential to increase flows of technology transfer to countries that 
are open to trade and investment (Maskus, 2000).  Seen in this light, there is some scope 
for IPRs to improve domestic productivity growth prospects in agriculture, even in the 
presence of trade liberalization. 
  The challenges posed by this mix of incentives for Asia-Pacific economies are 
significant and the outcomes of joint trade liberalization and IPR strengthening are 
difficult to predict.  For Japan and Korea to sustain a farming presence in the face of tariff 
liberalization and reduced farm supports, these countries would need to rationalize their 
agricultural incentives while encouraging more innovation.  Much has been written about 




reducing impediments to transacting in farmland.  That rationalization in itself should 
increase investment in new technologies and shift more agricultural innovation into the 
private sector.  However, there remains a need for effective systems of public and private 
agricultural innovation, with improved processes for moving public technologies into 
domestic use.  In this context, a policy emphasis on keeping the results of basic 
agricultural research, performed by public institutions, largely in the public domain can 
be beneficial for productivity growth.  Note also that research subsidies would have some 
ability, albeit limited, to substitute for reduced farm income supports and liberalized 
border restrictions. 
  Many Asian economies recognize the scope for innovation that is provided their 
farmers through the implementation and registration of geographical name protection, 
whether through certification marks, collective marks, or geographical indications.  Just 
as one essential purpose of plant variety rights is to increase the return to differentiating 
products in ornamental plants, produce, and trees, value can be created for specific 
localities through the use of such names.  Australia gains from a system of GIs in wines, 
permitting entrepreneurs in that country to trade on such names as Coonawarra and 
Barossa (Anderson, 2000).  The United States remains opposed to extending the GI 
system globally, in part because of the current use in its market of names that could 
become reclaimed property in such a world.  It would seem, however, that developing 
countries, including China, and even Japan and Korea would have little to fear from 
extending such protection in order to encourage innovation and product development 




  A final related challenge must be to rationalize the use of food safety standards 
and technical requirements in order to increase market access and expand market 
opportunities abroad (Maskus and Wilson, 2001).  It is likely that regional economies 
rely at times on arbitrary product standards to limit import competition in food and 
agriculture, a charge frequently leveled at Japan in particular.  While such standards may 
have a protective impact, they are impediments to rationalization and the introduction of 
more globalized technologies.  The most glaring example is the EU ban on imports of 
GM foods, mirrored by the rigorous labeling and tracking standards in Japan and Korea.  
Such restrictions tend to limit investments in exporting countries and limit the spread of 
technology.  Indeed, a potential ban on GM trade in Northeast Asia would have 
significantly negative impacts on Chinese welfare while limiting consumer choice in 
Japan and Korea (Anderson and Yao, 2001). 
b. Global IPR and Trade Negotiations 
  What might be said about the interests of the major Asia-Pacific economies in the 
intellectual property area, in light of potential regional and global agricultural trade 
liberalization?  A number of conclusions seem sensible from the foregoing analysis.   
  First, there is a broad similarity of intellectual property policies and objectives 
among the richer economies of the region.  While there is a sharp distinction in 
comparative advantage in agriculture, and therefore differing interests in pushing for cuts 
in border measures and farm supports, each of these countries the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, and Korea – sees advantages in promoting technological progress in the 
rural sector.  For Japan and Korea the challenge may be particularly acute as regards 




especially plant variety rights and some forms of geographical name recognition can 
assist the transition.  Indeed, given Japan's presence in developing new plant varieties, a 
significant export opportunity could be provided by stronger global protection.   
For its part, the government of China stresses the importance of modern 
agriculture for food security and rural development, supporting its encouragement of 
biotechnology adoption.  China and the United States share a mutual interest in reducing 
international resistance to genetically modified agricultural products.  In that regard they 
may wish to coordinate efforts in making sure that potential labeling requirements in 
major world markets are not onerous even as they push for greater market access. 
However, there are significant differences within the region.  The United States 
has gone far beyond the rest of the region in awarding patents to plants, multi-cellular 
organisms, non-traditional breeding methods, and genetic research technologies.  There is 
legitimate debate even within the United States about the wisdom of such strong 
protection, which reflects in part the capture of the patent system by corporate inventive 
interests in agribusiness and biotechnology.  U.S. negotiators in the Doha Round would 
like to re-open TRIPS Article 27.3 in order to widen the scope of patent eligibility 
requirements on a global scale.  However, such requirements could be ultimately 
damaging to the prospects for domestic innovation and technology diffusion in such 
countries as China and Vietnam, while limiting the scope for dynamic competition in 
Japanese agriculture.     
  Where such pressures could come to a head quickly is in the ongoing negotiations 
at WIPO concerning a global Patent Law Treaty, which aims to harmonize patent 




announced goal of those discussions is to reduce patent transactions costs through 
harmonization of procedures and concentration of patent examinations in a small number 
of national or regional offices.  However, both the United States and the European Union 
seek aggressively to export their patent standards to other economies.  In this context, it 
would be inadvisable for the developing economies of East Asia, including China, to 
accede to an agreement that established such standards.  Even Japan, Korea, and 
Australia could be disadvantaged by the increasingly broad scope of patent protection it 
would bring to key agricultural technologies. 
  Overall, then, while there is some scope for making tradeoffs between agricultural 
trade liberalization and intellectual property reform, the nations of the Asia-Pacific region 
do have somewhat separate interests as regards linking these areas.  Significant thought 
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Comparison of Agricultural IPRs in Major Asia-Pacific Economies 
 










United States  Yes  Yes  Yes  UPOV 1991  Certification marks 
Japan  Yes  Yes  Yes  UPOV 1991  Unfair competition laws 
China  No Yes No  UPOV  1978  Unfair  competition  laws 
R. of Korea  No  Yes  Yes  UPOV 1991  Certification marks 
Canada  No Yes No  UPOV  1978  Certification  marks 







Basic Agricultural Production Data (Average 1999-2003) 
 
Product Measure  US  Japan  China  Korea  Australia  Thailand  Vietnam 
Rice Paddy Area per capita (ha)  4540 13579 22836  22511 6930 166461 95937
 Production  (1000  mt)  9274 11125 182696  6878 1186 25828 33017
Maize  Area per capita (ha)  99491 1 18879  360 3795 19273 9802
 Production  (1000  mt)  243720 0 116878  68 372 4341 2275
Wheat  Area per capita (ha)  71851 1530 19594  31 619014 20 0
 Production  (1000  mt)  56848 714 96756  5 21171 1 0
Sugar   Area per capita (ha)  3369 714 1268  0 21653 14816 3990
 Production  (1000  mt)  59143 5264 92979  0 35473 59796 16197
Soybeans  Area per capita (ha)  102429 1069 6987  1759 1965 3400 1865
 Production  (1000  mt)  73314 253 15693  115 77 296 179
Cotton  Area per capita (ha)  18306 0 3303  0 18172 526 372
 Production  (1000  mt)  9975 0 14211  0 1396 45 32
Fruits &  Area per capita (ha)  4854 3487 14566  8600 4409 5811 7369
 Vegetables Production (1000 mt)  37912 12485 344669  11616 1871 3141 6958
Oil Cakes  Production (1000 mt)  38635 4558 27251  1191 508 1026 164
Wine Production  (1000  mt)  2385 103 1063  0 1052 0 0
Beef   Production (1000 mt)  12210 521 5250  241 2028 179 99
Fish & Sea  Production (1000 mt)* 5405 5521 44063  2282 236 3606 2010






International Trade in Agricultural Goods, 2002 ($ millions) 
Product Measure  US  Japan  China  Korea  Australia  Thailand  Vietnam* 
Rice Exports  775.3 0.3 392.2 0.1 86.3 1632.0 624.7
 Imports  162.3 213.6 110.0 44.9 27.5 0.4 0.7
 Balance  613.0 -213.3 282.2 -44.8 58.8 1631.6 624.0
Maize Exports  5127.6 8.0 1167.3 0.0 7.8 27.5 4.5
 Imports  137.2 1993.3 592.0 982.2 0.5 3.3 7.0
 Balance  4990.4 -1985.3 575.3 -982.2 7.3 24.2 -2.5
Wheat Exports  3631.9 2.3 70.1 0.0 1272.4 0.0 na
 Imports  266.2 1120.9 299.5 542.7 0.0 151.6 101.1
 Balance  3365.7 -1118.6 -229.4 -542.7 1272.4 -151.6 na
Sugar Exports 52.0 0.2 84.3 75.8 31.4 684.3 32.9
 Imports  559.7 273.9 306.0 284.8 2.8 0.0 21.3
 Balance  -507.7 -273.7 -221.7 -209.0 28.6 684.3 11.6
Soybeans Exports  5623.6 1.3 76.7 0.1 2.7 0.3 11.0
 Imports  27.5 1223.1 3019.0 318.0 0.4 324.3 1.9
 Balance  5596.1 -1221.8 -2942.3 -317.9 2.3 -324.0 9.1
Cotton Lint  Exports  2049.2 0.1 172.3 1.5 680.2 0.2 0.0
 Imports  19.9 250.3 509.7 370.9 0.1 461.9 124.0
 Balance  2029.3 -250.2 -337.4 -369.4 680.1 -461.7 -124.0
Fruits &  Exports  8169.4 0.0 4471.2 315.0 897.1 1293.5 321.5
  Vegetables  Imports  10166.5 5586.0 1206.5 694.4 512.0 157.5 55.2
 Balance  -1997.1 -5586.0 3264.7 -379.4 385.1 1136.0 266.3
Beef   Exports  368.9 0.0 0.4 0.0 76.3 0.0 0.0
 Imports  225.5 9.7 16.5 385.4 0.1 0.9 0.0
 Balance  143.4 -9.7 -16.1 -385.4 76.2 -0.9 0.0
Fish & Sea*  Exports  3356.3 779.6 6267.5 1160.1 901.2 4053.5 1783.4
 Imports  10315.1 13487.0 4132.4 1639.0 553.7 1059.9 31.9
 Balance  -6958.8 -12707.4 2135.1 -478.9 347.5 2993.6 1751.5
Wine Exports  527.0 2.3 5.0 0.0 1272.4 2.1 0.0
 Imports  2654.6 800.4 46.8 29.4 76.5 7.5 6.6
 Balance  -2127.6 -798.1 -41.8 -29.4 1195.9 -5.4 -6.6






Producer Subsidy Equivalents for Agricultural Support Programs, 2001 (percent) 
 
Product  United States Japan  Rep. of Korea Canada  Australia 
Wheat 40.0  86.2  na  18.0  4.2 
Maize 26.4  na  na  15.5  na 
Rice 46.8  86.4  81.2  na  5.3 
Oilseeds 25.5 56.1  88.5  19.6  2.9 
Refined sugar  48.4  40.8  na  na  10.4 







Estimated Border Protection in Agriculture, 1999-2001 (Average Bound Tariff Rates) 
 
Product  United States Japan  Rep. of Korea Canada  Australia  Thailand  China* 
Wheat  1.3  na 101.0 12.0 1.3 32.3  12 
Cereals 2.7  16.3  191.0  3.3  2.0  37.3  20 
Rice  na na na  na na  na  -3 
Oilseeds 10.0 2.0  60.5  3.0 2.5 36.0  32 
Sugar  4.5 70.7 27.0  8.0 15.0  49.0  40 
Cotton  5.7 3.0 9.3  7.0  10.3 16.7  27 
Meats  6.0 12.0 31.0  5.0  2.0  35.0  -15 
Fruits & Vegs. 5.5  10.0  91.0  5.5  5.0  39.0  -4 
Notes: *Data for China are estimates of nominal rates of protection.  Data for other countries are averages across primary and 





Average In-quota and Over-quota Tariff Rates by Major Region, 2001 
  North America  Asia-Pacific 
Product  In-quota Over-quota In-quota Over-quota 
Cereals 25  80  12  321 
Oilseeds 10  148  19  485 
Sugar 28  109  27  61 
Cotton 2  15  na  na 









Statistics on UPOV Plant Variety Certificates 
 






Issued to Residents  Issued to non-
Residents 
Country  1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998  2002  1998  2002 
US  3207  4037  406  257 53 30 66  345  2  32 
(Patents)  6169 8094  346  454  374  690  245 518 316 615 
Japan 4071  5465 793 799 241 269 869  1035  148  286 
China 19  216  271*  299 1*  8  19* 92 0* 0 
Korea na  323  234  260 0  342  na  76  na 0 
Canada  425 936  62  62  296  412  53 34 92  194 
Australia 947  1578  107  121  115  208  95 127 123 159 






Cumulative US Patents Awarded in Agricultural Technologies and Revealed Technology Advantages, 1997-2001 
 
  United States  Japan  China  Rep. of Korea  Canada  Australia 
Code Grants RTA Grants RTA Grants RTA Grants RTA Grants RTA Grants RTA 
047  636 1.31  69 0.38  0 0.00  1  0.05  46 2.42  24 5.65 
071  137 0.97  27 0.51  1 5.27  4  0.73  17 3.09  10 8.13 
119  1381 1.39  48 0.13  0 0.00  8  0.21  71 1.83  24 2.77 
424  19865 1.08 3057 0.44  54 2.17  192  0.27  955 1.32  266 1.65 
426  2298 1.12  385 0.50  3 1.08  28  0.35  74 0.92  24 1.34 
435  12316 1.24 1591 0.43  12 0.89  98  0.25  529 1.36  165 1.89 
504  486 0.77  188 0.80  2 2.35  8  0.33  12 0.49  10 1.82 
800  1820 1.40  74 0.15  3 1.71  11  0.22  85 1.67  23 2.02 
438  7604 0.80 3874 1.09  3 0.23  1512  4.08  39 0.10  11 0.13 
ALL  398581    149642  538   15564   15604  3484  
 
Notes: 047 = Plant husbandry; 071 = Chemistry: fertilizers; 119 = Animal husbandry; 424 = Bio-affecting drugs; 426 = Food or edible 
material; 435 = Molecular biology and microbiology; 504 = Plant protecting compositions; 800 = Multicellular living 
organisms; 438 = Semiconductor device manufacturing: process.  Source:  http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/tecstc 
 
 
 